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Old and New Approaches to Marketing – The Quest of Their Epistemological Roots 
 
Abstract 
In recent years the marketing discipline faced a considerable increase in the number of 
approaches.  This paper try to investigate if the proliferation of labels related to alleged new 
methods of marketing analysis actually implies a distinctions of subjects being studied and 
different epistemological premises. 
 
1. In search of a conceptual classification 
1.1 The proliferation of marketing problematics  
This article was born from the observation that marketing science is facing a growing 
proliferation of thematics and approaches. This fact is not new and generally coincides with 
significant transformations in the international economic system1. Lately, however, marketing 
studies favoured a fragmented interpretation of consumer and firm’s realities, thus creating an 
explosion of new labels. Some of these new labels are probably just new “names” advertised to 
sell “old” products. But some may contain significant new issues that need to be identified and 
discussed. Do these new marketing denominations (viral, retro, vintage, postmodern, judo, tribal, 
buzz, and many more) identify distinctions on subjects being studied, without particular 
methodological implications, or rather, do new labels and new subjects imply orientations that 
start from different epistemological premises and involve different research methodologies? If the 
answer is affirmative, then what are the most significant methodological differences? The 
differentiation of actual content of various approaches to marketing has obviously already been 
dealt with in a large number of contributions, however, it seems that the range of different 
approaches has been considered primarily in terms of the object of study - consider, for example, 
the debates on micro and macro marketing2. A much less analyzed issue is whether a different 
object of study is also embedded in diverse epistemological hypotheses. Marketing, as Kotler 
thinks or describes it, seems to refer to methodological hypotheses and interpretative models that 
are substantially different from those that characterize postmodern marketing3. Our impression, in 
                                                 
1 We indicate, for example, debates of the 1960s on the system and environmental approach to marketing and in the 
1970s on the consistency of scientific marketing and in those same years, on micro and macromarketing.  
2 See Hunt & Burnett (1982).  
3 See for example  “Kotler is dead!” of Alan Smithee (1997), Brown (1995) and Cova (1996). 
 3
general, is that the effort of the authors to clarify the characteristics of new proposed approaches 
is too limited, leaving the reader with uncertainties on their methodological position. In particular, 
the aspect that we think is most neglected, and which is of crucial value for the correct 
understanding of new approaches, is the methodological, and especially the epistemological, 
characterization of the new scientific proposals. The risk of this proliferation of approaches4, 
insufficiently delineated in their epistemological assumptions, is incommunicability. Our 
objective thus is to undertake a taxonomy of methodological specificity that characterizes the 
most significant marketing approaches, seeking to highlight the epistemological differences and 
the effects that these differences produce in the way to interpret it. Our objective is not to evaluate 
the validity of the different approaches, a goal that would undoubtedly be of extreme interest, but 
which seems to us to be too ambitious in this particular setting5. We aim at building a taxonomic 
grid that allows a fruitful comparison of different methodological assumptions. 
 
1.2 The integration and opposition of the different epistemological schools  
Our taxonomy is articulated on the following three levels:  
a.  the epistemological level or rather, the alternative approaches with which the methodological 
statute of the various sciences are defined;   
b.  the economic theory level that defines the evolution of research approaches that are most 
relevant for economic science and therefore also for the firm theory; 
c.  the marketing theory level with regards to their corresponding economic and epistemological 
approach.  
This taxonomy range from general (1st level) to more specific themes (2nd and 3rd level). We 
assume, therefore, that there is a close connection between a 1° level approach and the 
corresponding and coherent approaches that can be identified on the 2° and the 3° level. In 
different words, one who, at the first level, assumes an epistemological approach of some kind 
(e.g.: “empiricist”) is expected to (or should) assume the same approach at the level of both 
                                                 
4 The analysis of the reasons for the proliferation of approaches would also be a matter of great interest that we 
cannot however tackle here, but it should be mentioned that some of the reasons are the globalization process and a 
proliferation of communication channels (ICT) through which new communicators are able to express their positions. 
Other reasons stem from the fact that the formulation of the different approaches has become part of a market system 
(management training market, university education market, consultancy market, etc.) and therefore the comparison of 
ideas does not always have a prevailing scientific basis. 
5 Of course the taxonomy inevitably entails some form of judgment, but here we will seek to build a reading grid, as 
neutral as possible, in an attempt to clarify the most significant  specificities of different approaches. 
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economic and marketing theory (respectively, the second and the third level of the taxonomy). 
Of course we are aware that our taxonomy is a simplification; however we believe this is an 
appropriate instrument to open a fruitful debate on the analysis criteria and on the subject matter 
in question. Maybe someone will want to revise some classification criteria here and there, while 
someone else perhaps will intend to review the whole taxonomy from its foundations. We accept 
this and we affirm that similar opposing arguments are useful and productive because this is what 
should take place in a mutual clarification of positions, instead  of present debate, which is 
conducted in uncertain and disorderly way, without precise forms of comparison and without 
appropriate conceptual tools. For example, some may ask why analyzing the various marketing 
contributions we concerned ourselves with classifying economic and epistemological approaches 
as well. The answer is that a contrast of approaches and marketing theories alone (3° level) would 
not have allowed us to clarify (or attempt to do so) the classification. The meaning and scope of 
the various marketing theories can be expressed with sufficient accuracy only looking backwards 
at the methodological roots of these settings that revert back to the 2° and 1° level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. The epistemological level.  
2.1 The source of knowledge 
Epistemology or Theory of Knowledge is the science that studies knowledge in general, but 
above all, it studies the particular form of knowledge that is scientific knowledge6 and therefore 
                                                 
6 According to some, the only form of "real" knowledge is scientific knowledge and therefore this term also covers 
any form of knowledge, but we feel that this issue can be omitted here. 
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the scientific validity of the different sciences and scientific approaches. What we must achieve at 
this level is a classification of the approaches that were (and are) used as the basis of the various 
theories of knowledge. The difficulty in this classification is that each approach has gone through 
a long evolution and through numerous changes over time as a result of debates among scholars. 
We cannot give an account of the enormous variety of individual approaches and thus we propose 
to group them according to their prevalent paradigms7. However, although every paradigm is a 
living conceptualization, evolving over time, the modifications do not put their inner core in 
doubt. Thus, if in a synchronic sense it is possible that some paradigms have a well-defined 
identity, as can be said for example of empiricism in the XVII and XVIII century, in a diachronic 
sense the empiricist paradigm has somewhat changed as a result of the need to overcome intrinsic 
methodological difficulties and responding to criticism brought about by alternative research 
approaches. Unfortunately, in the space available in an article, it is necessary to introduce some 
simplifications but we think that this is acceptable with reference to the scope of our analysis. 
In order to classify the different approaches from a methodological point of view we posed the 
following question: what is the source of scientific knowledge? The schools of thought give 
different answers to this question. In our 1° level taxonomy the most significant answers appear 
to be the following: 
(a)  experience ("empiricism”)  
(b)  reason ("radical rationalism”)  
(c)  reason together with experience ("critical rationalism”)  
(d)  historical reason together with experience ("weberian" approach)  
(e)  human empathy with historical reality ("hermeneutic" approach) 
Of course each approach has many internal specifications since there is no outstanding scholar 
who has not elaborated his own original approach and which should therefore, strictly speaking, 
occupy a single and exclusive box in our taxonomic system. Obvious reasons of simplicity lead 
us to regroup different authors into a single box. Consequently, the denominations of the 
individual approaches are regarded as useful in order to define a certain approach without the 
proposed denomination being assigned an absolute value. We intentionally refer with quotation 
marks to the approaches outlined in the prior illustration. Herewith following we eliminate the 
quotation marks for simplicity, but it is understood that these labels have purely heuristic valence 
                                                 
7 The concept of paradigm entered the epistemological vocabulary through the work of Khun  (1962). 
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also because the individual approaches evolved over a long period of time and have gone through 
a multiplicity of adjustments that in this context are impossible to account for. However, within a 
framework that has known numerous and profound changes, some fundamental differences 
remain that justify both combining them in the extended categories indicated here with the term 
"approach" and using corresponding labels as a distinction of the approaches. A particularly 
relevant aspect, which we return to later, is that these approaches in some cases are thought of as 
relevant to all the sciences (natural and social) without distinction, in other cases, a certain 
approach is instead focused on either only the natural or only the social sciences. For example, 
the empiricist approach was born in the XVI Century, that is to say, a period when only natural 
sciences were considered. The social sciences were either not taken into account or were subject 
to reductionism8 that assimilated them, ultimately, to natural events. For instance, in a 
mechanistic version of science there is no need to distinguish between natural science and social 
science by the simple fact that the latter is reduced to manifestations of the first. 
 Finally, we stress that our intention is not to express an opinion of the validity of the 
considered approaches. We are interested in defining as correctly as possible the essential aspects 
of each peculiar epistemological approach, and in linking it to the corresponding economic 
paradigm and thereafter to a particular framework of marketing problematics in literature. In 
other words, we are trying to characterize the contributions of marketing through the search of the 
fil rouge that links them to its parent epistemological methodology and a certain economic 
approach, regarded as the framework within which the individual marketing contributions acquire 
concreteness. 
 
2.2 Nomothetic science and historical sciences 
Before turning to the presentation of the proposed taxonomy, it is necessary to clarify the 
important division of sciences in function of the epistemological approaches that may be assigned 
them by scholars. This distinction concerns nomothetic and historical sciences. The distinction 
stems from the fact that traditionally the assertion of science in western thought was inspired by 
the distinction between the subject (who investigates) and the object (to be investigated). This 
distinction was viewed as necessary to conceive genuine knowledge, i.e. scientific knowledge as 
based on a clear distinction between subject and object. The subject, respecting certain rules of 
                                                 
8 For a detailed analysis of trends in reductionist science, see Piaget (1970).   
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investigation, could carry out a study of the object without being influenced by its own opinions, 
insuring the validity of the proceedings. A validity that could also be demonstrated by a repetition 
of the investigation-experiment by other parties, thereby assuring an intersubjective verification 
of the results of scientific analysis. Furthermore, the distinction between subject and object 
presumes that the results that emerge from scientific analysis refers to "rules" intended as 
quantitative relations, invariant in time and space. The lives of objects are independent from the 
analysis of the subject. The nomothetic discipline is therefore configured as a system of 
hypotheses that, if objectively confirmed, turn into a system of laws of universal value9. It goes 
without saying that natural sciences are conceived as typically nomothetic and that the successes 
achieved in these disciplines were considered significant enough to profoundly affect the way of 
seeing these sciences and thus becoming the point of reference for all other disciplines. The social 
sciences also tended initially to be built on the nomothetic structure. Certainly, economics, in 
view of its typical quantitative curvature, is set according to these canons, and similarly, 
sociology in Auguste Comte’s positivistic approach. However, Marxist criticism of political 
economy and the German historicistic philosophical thought (following the Romantic Movement) 
emphasized how the social sciences cannot be framed in a nomothetic approach and by their very 
nature should be constructed on a necessary connection with history. This debate, which began in 
the second half of the XIX century, is still going on today. We mention it just to remember that 
there are a multitude of positions assumed by the various schools of thought in this field. 
 
2.3 The empiricist approach 
With reference to point (a) those who rely on experience as a source of exclusive 
knowledge are usually seen as belonging to the family of empiricism. It assumes that experience 
is both the exclusive source of knowledge and the means of validation of a theory. Thinkers who 
should be regarded as among the most important initiators of this school are: Francis Bacon 
(1561-1626), Galileo Galilei (1564-1642), John Locke (1632-1704) and David Hume (1711-
1776). Among the salient characterizations of this school is the assumption that the truths that 
man can access are based on the senses and are therefore understandable only through experience. 
                                                 
9 Aron (1967): “The particular process of the natural sciences is to consider the general characteristics of the 
phenomena and to establish regular and necessary relations between them. It tends to build a system of laws or 
relations that are always more general and as far as is possible of a mathematical nature. Newtonian physics is natural 
science’s ideal model” 
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Similarly, the mind is seen as a kind of "tabula rasa" or “blank slate"10 that in time is filled with 
knowledge acquired through experience. This approach therefore favors knowledge that can be 
acquired through evidence derived from experiments. Another characteristic aspect of this 
approach consists in the knowledge gained as an "a posteriori" result and then confronted with 
knowledge gained "a priori" which had a wide following in continental Europe starting from 
Descartes and took particular root in German philosophy from Kant (1724-1804) onwards. The 
search for a viable theory according to empiricism favors induction. Inductivism is based on the 
thought that scientific theories are essentially the generalization of observed data, in the sense that 
they are based on a widespread generalization of a large number of concurred observations. This 
approach, which can be traced back to Francis Bacon and which received the powerful 
endorsement of Isaac Newton, is also the basis of probabilistic validation of a theory. The initial 
inductive position was attenuated by scholars who continued to recognize themselves in the 
empiricism passing from tout court inductivism to probabilistic inductivism11. This approach is 
also characterized by methodological atomism, in the sense that what can be investigated are 
individual "things", the individual elements of the reality. In more radical versions of empiricism, 
all authentic knowledge falls within the framework of science and every other form of belief is 
none other than a subjective view of an irrelevant assumption (metaphysical). The early version 
of Political Economy (Smith, Ricardo and Marx) and the following anglo-saxon economic 
tradition (from Stuart Mill to Alfred Marshall) can be classified as leading member of 
empiricism. 
 
2.4 The radical rationalism 
Another distinct epistemological stance opposed to empiricism is the radical rationalism12 
traditionally traced back to Descartes (1596-1650), according to which, reason is the source of 
knowledge and provides access to the truth through speculation. Human reason is innate and 
                                                 
10 This characterization, which was emphasized by John Locke, is to be seen especially as an opposition both to 
Scholastic philosophy which tended to assume that man had innate ideas (innatism) as well as the Cartesian 
rationalism that takes reason as the yardstick of truth rather than experience.  
11 We recall that, as a result of subsequent epistemological criticism, the initial inductivism position was attenuated. 
According to Bertrand Russell, induction is necessary to science, but not infallible. Induction can never demonstrate 
the truth of theories, but only increase their probability. Consequently, faith in induction depends on our subjective 
belief and is therefore not scientifically demonstrable. Russell (1912). 
12 Some authors, intending to express a judgment of the scientific validity of these approaches, speak of dogmatic 
rationalism. See for example Goldman (1945). However, we recall again, the research we propose is targeted at the 
presentation of the approaches and has sought to use labels that do not imply evaluative judgments. 
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independent of experience. It uses data of experience as materials that are useful to exercise 
reason, but it is only reason that is able to express the laws of nature using mathematical 
language. This definition was further strengthened in the subsequent developments of Baruch 
Spinoza (1632-1677) and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716). By starting out from 
fundamental principles that are intuitively identifiable, it is possible, through a deductive process, 
to arrive at knowledge. Leibniz thought that in principle, all knowledge, including scientific 
knowledge, could be achieved only by using reason, although recognizing that in practice this 
was not feasible due to the limitations of every human being. While rationalism exalts the power 
of reason to develop knowledge from itself, empiricism states that reason is powerless when it 
prescinds from data provided by experience. The characterization of the radical rationalism is 
based on the assumption that it is possible to know reality through the thought using intellectual 
principles. According to Descartes and Leibniz knowledge must be based on a priori principles. 
Of course, the rationalistic framework is very articulate and includes different positions, in 
part derived from the development of these first positions, in function of the progress of natural 
sciences, in part derived also from the cultural specificities of different philosophers. Of interest 
to us, among the aspects of the radical rationalism applied to science, is the deductivist approach. 
Assuming some premises that intuition judges as true, called axioms, as is the case in geometry, 
then it is possible to draw some necessary conclusions that have the same degree of truth as the 
premises. For those who recognize themselves in it , such radical rationalism has the merit of 
assuming the knowledge of universal truth. It is about stable certainties, based on the closed and 
self-sufficient interiority of a logical-mathematical language. This approach appears to show 
significant affinity with the marginalist economics of the Lausanne school13 that further 
represents the economic majority paradigm and is therefore of great importance to our taxonomic 
proposal. 
Whilst France had le siècle des Lumières as a further development of the démarche 
cartesienne, Germany had a double phase, that of Romanticism, where history is seen as the 
manifestation of an absolute principle of the realization of man’s destiny, and that of Kant’s 
                                                 
13 The Lausanne school, whose best-known representatives are Leon Walras (1834-1910) and Wilfredo Pareto (1848-
1923), is opposed to the decidedly more empirical approach of Alfred Marshall (1842-1924). While for Marshall 
adherence to the reality of the descriptive hypotheses of their models (the analysis of partial equilibrium is typical) 
are a prime concern, for the members of the Lausanne school, analysis of general economic equilibrium can be 
disengaged from realistic hypotheses in order to get to a sort of "essence" of the economic facts (pure economics) 
that represent the "axioms" from which to develop the deductive chains that lead to the analysis of markets’ 
functioning and identification of their respective equilibria.  
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critique. In the Enlightenment14 the centre of gravity of knowledge is still represented by reason, 
but the concept of reason is more modest than the Cartesian one and experience also plays an 
important role to express a philosophy of history oriented to progress and to the overcoming of 
the most direct human needs. Romanticism instead denied any value to experience and 
nomothetic sciences because they cannot give the absolute truth sought by the romantic 
movement that entirely relied on an infinite and omnipotent reason expressed in history that 
dominates and constitutes the unity of the world. This transcendent reason is a spiritual force that 
manifests itself in history and that can be perceived because it is embedded in history15. It is 
difficult to imagine anything further from empiricism than romanticism. Given its 
characterization in a metaphysical sense, romanticism also seems distant from radical rationalism. 
However, the point of arrival of these two visions is quite similar in that they are representative of 
the possibility to reach an understanding of things in themselves, an understanding of the absolute 
essence of things. In the case of radical rationalism, we move to an objective understanding 
represented by the mathematization of the reality intended as a mechanic system. In the case of 
romanticism instead, attainment of the absolute occurs, represented by the concurrence of the 
universal and the individual, when we move to the recognition of the organic connection of an 
infinite multiplicity of historical phenomena as summarized in the philosophy of history 
(historicism). In this sense Romanticism has a very important role because it places the historical 
process at the center of its speculations. An analysis that will be resumed later, although with a 
characterization decidedly distinct from the hermeneutic school on which we will focus shortly. 
 
2.5 The critical rationalism 
The work of Immanuel Kant, who we here see as the initiator of the approach denoted as 
critical rationalism, is extremely vast. We focus our attention on the more epistemological aspects 
that seem of particular importance to us. Kant is accredited with having problematized the limits 
of knowledge attainable with empiricism. After years of careful study of Hume’s work, the 
philosopher from Könisberg reached the conviction that empiricism (which Kant denotes as 
"atomistic") is not able to access true knowledge in that it cannot be constructed as a mere sum of 
                                                 
14 From Montesquieu to the exponents of Encyclopédie; Diderot and D'Alembert via Turgot and Condorcet.  
15 There is also a side of romanticism in which the infinity of the conscience is represented by feelings. In this 
opposite version, harshly criticized by G. W. F. Hegel (1770-1831) as an exponent of "rational" romanticism, 
feelings represent the infinite form and reveal themselves better in art than in philosophy. 
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observations and single assertions. It is necessary that these should be structured in a more 
inclusive system, essential to give precise and specific meanings to the single facts incorporated 
by experience. It is interesting to note that Kant’s approach, which we have labeled as critical 
rationalism, underpins the framework of the nomothetic sciences but develops a critique of 
particular importance on the empiricist approach and poses a dialectic between the “totality” of 
the world and the single "fact" that must be solved to build truly scientific knowledge. For Kant, 
the possibility that humans have to communicate and agree in the general categories of thought, 
requires a common sharing represented by synthetic a priori judgments. According to Kant, 
empiricism, which in economics assumes Benthamian utilitarianism, does not have access to 
knowledge as it is self-confined in an atomism that sees only the parts and not the whole16. Kant 
wanted to distance himself also from the position that we have indicated as radical rationalism 
(and which to Kant seemed dogmatic rationalism) which presumes being able to attain knowledge 
of the absolute through reason17. 
The role of Kant is of particular interest to our taxonomy in that placing the problematic 
relation between the totality and its parts foreshadowed subsequent epistemological positions of 
relevant interest such as those developed in Gestalt Psychology (Piaget 1970), Structuralism 
(Piaget 1968), the Theory of Systems (Von Bertalanffy 1969), the Postmodern Thought (Lyotard 
1984) and the Thought of Complexity (Luhmann 1984 and Morin 2005). As far as it concerns 
economic theory the critical rationalism is close to “New Austrian School” of von Mises and von 
Hayeck. 
 
2.6  The Weberian approach 
Max Weber’s (1834-1910) vision was developed with specific reference to social sciences, 
and specifically to sociology, Weber assumes for Sociology the research of general laws but 
restricted to a specific period of time because any social science cannot evade intersubjective 
analysis and the findings of experience. He matured his approach through the development of a 
                                                 
16 This kind of argument was stimulated by a multiplicity of subsequent elaborations moving from philosophy to the 
social sciences and sociology in particular. Consider, for example, this piece by Adorno (1969) "The theoretical 
reflections on society as a whole may not be entirely replaced by empiricist investigations, tending to escape from 
them, as spirits do in parapsychological experiments. Every vision of society in its entirety necessarily transcends its 
scattered facts. The construction of the totality has as its first condition a concept of things on the basis of which to 
organize the disparate data". 
17 The readings of Kant’s thought are numerous and often divergent. The analysis carried out by Goldmann (1945) 
seemed particularly acute to us. 
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synthesis that on the one hand, does not fall alongside the sociological positivism drawn up by 
August Comte (1798-1857) and further developed (according to a less radical positivism) by 
Émile Durkheim (1858-1917), but which, on the other hand, does not end up adhering to a 
romantic approach in which the knowledge in a social science automatically derives from the 
social nature of man. His entire methodological elaboration is centered on the problem of how to 
achieve a nomothetic scientific development constructed with reference to general laws that do 
not disregard history. To Weber, sociology is neither a simple auxiliary discipline of historical 
sciences nor a science that is legitimated through the recourse to laws of absolute value. The 
solution is to be sought in the construction of scientific knowledge that is empirically verifiable 
and characterized by a general meaning but with reference to a precise historical context. Weber 
considered the vision of the world and the concept of science developed from positivism to have 
failed since the subsequent realities in which man lives (feudalism, capitalism, etc.) represent 
profoundly different historical-cultural realities that cannot be reprised or reconducted within 
universal laws. It is nevertheless necessary to remain faithful to the principle that founds the 
validity of scientific affirmations not based on over-empiricist presuppositions, as is the case in 
historicism, but on empirically demonstrable data. Weber’s synthesis came about through a 
unification of the three stages of scientific work: empirical research, theoretical elaboration and 
generalized interpretation of the collective social formations. To Weber "cultural" sciences are as 
scientific as those termed "exact" and the relation to the values in human actions is the means 
with which to analyze objectively a cultural reality18. In historical or sociological sciences, 
intuition has a different function from that in natural sciences. The historical and sociological 
propositions concern observable facts, aimed at reaching a defined reality represented by the 
behavior of man in the meaning that the very same agents attribute to it. Every society has its own 
culture and the sociologist tries to understand how man has lived through the countless forms of 
existence that become intelligible only in the light of the system of beliefs and knowledge 
specific to the society considered. To construct the historical individuality of a given society, 
Weber proposes the use of the "ideal type" concept. In Max Weber’s comprehensive sociology, 
the ideal type plays a role similar to the hypothetic-deductive model used in the nomothetic 
sciences, i.e. construction subjected to verification. It is "a conceptual framework that combines 
                                                 
18 Aron (1967). 
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certain relations and certain processes of historical life in a cosmos of conceptual connections, in 
itself devoid of contradictions"19.  
The Weberian approach is characterized by the search for synthesis in the definition of the 
classification of the social sciences. A formulation that seems relevant to us in as much as it is the 
methodological root of a trend of institutional economic studies developed in various countries, 
but which probably had its most significant exponents in American Institutionalism - on which 
more later. It is important to stress that the Weberian approach, while denying the possibility of 
universal economic laws, does not recognized itself in the German historical school which 
Schumpeter subdivided into the "old", represented by Bruno Hildebrand (1812-1878), Wilhelm 
Roscher (1817-1894) and Karl Knies (1821-1898), and the "new" historical school of Gustav 
Schmoller (1838-1917). The approach of the historical school, and in particular, that typified by 
Schmoller, is summarized by Schumpeter in this way: "Schmoller always protested against an 
<isolation> analysis of economic phenomena – he and his followers talked [referring to the neo-
classical economy of a nomothetic structure] of the <isolation method> and claimed that we lose 
their essence as soon as we isolate them. This opinion, of course, was simply the result of their 
intention to nurture the economy exclusively with historical monographs. […] Nothing in the 
cosmos or in social chaos really remains outside of the Schmollerian economy. In principle, if not 
entirely in practice, the Schmollerian economist was in fact a sociologist with a historicist 
mentality in the widest meaning of the term20. 
Schumpeter classifies Weber as an exponent of the "very young" historicist school together 
with Werner Sombart (1863-1941). However, it should be noted, as Schumpeter himself declared 
in the History of Economic Analysis "our interest in methodology as such is only limited" and he 
fails to highlight the important methodological differences between the historicist school of strict 
historic-idealistic observance and Weber’s position. 
 
2.7 The hermeneutic approach 
Before trying to characterize this school, it should be noted that the first three approaches 
essentially have as a reference the natural sciences where the search for universal and ahistorical 
                                                 
19 Weber (1922). 
20 Schumpeter (1954). 
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laws is expected 21. In other words, both empiricism and rationalism depart from the idea of a 
single science to which either the induction or the deduction principles are applied, but both 
pursue the objective of generalization, or rather the search for applicable laws to a multiplicity of 
situations and moments. The measure of the validity or, if preferred, of the hierarchy of a law is 
given by its own degree of generalization. The more general a law is (in the sense that it had 
general validity) the higher is its rank22 within the scientific framework. Therefore, failing to 
define and validate highly general laws in the realm of social sciences, meant that social sciences 
were positioned on a lower rank than the natural laws. Nevertheless, according to an approach 
that intends to implement a nomothetic program also for the social sciences, social scientists must 
deal with the "social facts" considered as things that can be subjected to positive analysis through 
the same methodology used in the natural sciences. The typical exponent of this reductionist 
program in social sciences, and specifically in sociology, is Auguste Comte (1798-1857). He 
speaks explicitly of sociology intended as "socio-physical" in that it is constructed with laws 
similar to those of the physical world23 and targeted at the study of social behavior that can be 
defined in terms of manifested, observable and physically ascertainable actions. This program 
seemed extremely radical and unacceptable to an idealistic cultural tradition such as the German 
one, which tended to interpret not only history, but also the world, according to a historicist 
perspective. It is not surprising therefore, that in the German-speaking world there was, we could 
say almost in reaction, a strong reaffirmation of  historicism in the definition of the methodo-
logical statute of the social sciences, thanks also to the fact that the positivist scientific program, 
in Comte’s formulation, appeared to be denoted by significant weaknesses. The historical school 
of economics, as previously mentioned, can effectively be seen as the attempt to give a historic 
answer to the construction of a methodology to be applied to the social sciences. However, if 
Comte’s positivism was unbalanced on the one hand, then on the other so was Hildebrand and 
Schmoller’s historicist school. Both because applied to economics, that is to say, to the social 
sciences for which the search for universal laws then seemed more justified with respect to 
                                                 
21 This connotation is certainly a little too coarse with reference to the critical rationalist approach. However, there is 
no doubt that as regards Kant, the objective to beat was empiricist atomism and Benthamian utilitarianism and, 
secondly, at his time social sciences were still treated with a reductionist and mechanistical view. 
22 Marsonet (2005). 
23 In this respect, we also note that years later, in the XX century, “physical economics" is spoken of. In Italy, an 
exponent of this approach is Palomba (1948), more recently instead "econophysics" is spoken of. In France 
LaRouche (1998) proposed a re-edition of physical economics. See also Mirowski (1989). 
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sociology for example, and because the historicist program would have needed a powerful 
methodology to counter the then prevailing marginalist school, which its exponents instead did 
not affront, unlike Weber with particular reference to sociology. The historicist school was also 
left open to significant criticism that did not fail to arrive from German economists who could 
also argue with the neoclassic economists on specific points, but who fully recognized the need to 
preserve the nomothetic statute to economics. This is how the famous "strife over methods" 
(Methodenstreit) came about which saw the Austrian economists Carl Menger and Böhm-
Bawerk24 marshal against economic historicism. 
The hermeneutic approach in turn can be seen as an effort by the German culture to 
elaborate a response against the "alleged objective knowledge of science”. A program that found 
undoubted nurturing in the crisis that traversed the economic and social nomothetic thought in the 
first half of the 20th century, traversed by two world wars and the solidity of the laws of 
economic science deeply shaken by the crisis of the late 1920s in the USA, but then extending to 
the whole western economy. The hermeneutic school traces a clear distinction between natural 
and social sciences and is only concerned by the latter. A peculiar feature of social sciences is that 
they may not be reduced to facts (even if social ones) in that those same facts, when placed in 
different contexts assume, or can assume, completely different meanings. According to Hans 
Georg Gadamer (1900-2002), the most representative figure of the hermeneutic approach25, social 
sciences and natural sciences are radically different, since the first inevitably depend on the 
interpretative process – typically human – of the significant behavior and of the social practices 
on which such behavior is based. In other words, natural science holds with causal objective 
processes, while the social sciences concern significant activities and practices. Only the causal 
processes may be explained and described objectively; human activities and practices require 
interpretation and understanding. In summary, the explanation is the objective of the natural 
sciences while understanding is the aim of the social sciences26. 
The hermeneutic problem (intended as a theory of interpretation of classical texts) had 
already been dealt with by Friedich Schleiermarcher (1768-1834), who, however, had a vision of 
hermeneutics that was still a long way off from the traits that it assumed with Gadamer. While for 
                                                 
24 See for example Böhm-Bawerk (1890). 
25 Gadamer had numerous precursors in the context of historicism, among these, the most important was probably 
Dilthey (1833-1911), while Schleiermacher (1768-1834) had already used the term “hermeneutic”. 
26 Gadamer (1972) and Marsonet (2005). 
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the former, hermeneutics allowed understanding the text of an author in the most authentic way 
possible, through a return to the past that allowed reliving the historical basis on the 
presupposition of the text examined, for the latter this operation was not feasible because of the 
impossiblity to return to the past in an objective way, since the present and contingent existence 
of man is the place where a pre-understanding is necessarily formed (stratified knowledge that 
characterizes the understanding of a present state) of the reality that will also necessarily 
contaminate the idea of the past. For Gadamer it is therefore impossible to return objectively to 
the past, as this generates necessarily a pre-understanding that makes the vision of the past 
something different from the past itself. This is how a hermeneutic circle27 is formed: the 
understanding of a historical text is conditioned by a pre-understanding, which is determined by 
all relations of understanding and pre-understanding from the past. The understanding of a 
historic moment, therefore, is the result of this unceasing circular stratification of concepts that 
constantly form on themselves, starting from the preceding concepts.  
We have therefore arrived at a completely antithetical position to empiricism. In the social 
sciences, according to Gadamer’s approach, human reason is not a tabula rasa, on the contrary, it 
is a tabula plena, full of pre-judgments (in the sense of judgments that precede a careful analysis 
of social issues to be analyzed) that may result as justified or unjustified in subsequent analysis, 
but which are nevertheless not eliminable and the necessary medium through which the 
individual is connected to the social totality. If in atomism there are first the facts, which must be 
kept rigorously separate from interpretations, in the hermeneutic view of social sciences this 
separation is totally illusory as stated by Friedrich Nietzsche’s (1844-1900) assertion: "against 
positivism, which stops at the phenomena <there are only facts> - I should say: no, actually there 
are no facts but only interpretations"28. As seen in the hermeneutic approach, we have a re-
proposition of questions already raised by Kant on the relationship between "form and content" or 
between "totality and its parts", but here the synthesis is profoundly different in that it is totality 
that gives meaning to the parts, a position that also recalls some of the structuralism  and 
functionalism positions.  
 
                                                 
27 In the introduction to Verità e Metodo, Vattimo, drawing up a short summary of the hermeneutic circle in the 
history of philosophy, specifies that "In its simplest form the hermeneutic circle means that the parts of a text can 
only be understood in the light of the whole, but the whole can be understood only in light of the parts". Vattimo 
(1983). 
28 Referred to by Foriero (1993).  
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3. The level of the economic theory 
3.1. From Political Economy to Economics 
The 2nd level taxonomic classification, that of economic theory, can be usefully formulated 
starting out from the relationship of the various economic paradigms with the natural sciences. 
Economics, but also law, sociology, anthropology, psychology, etc., must therefore define its own 
field in relation, on the one hand, to the natural sciences and, on the other, to history. Assimilating 
economics to natural sciences means assuming an economic science that aims at a universalistic 
program where history is an accident. In this perspective, if economics wants to be a science, on 
par with the natural sciences, it must get rid of history to point to forms of knowledge that have 
universal validity. If instead the choice is in favor of marking a distance between natural and 
social sciences, the necessity to build new criteria of epistemological coherence for the social 
sciences becomes clear. 
Initially economics was born as political economy and this distinction means that the 
perspective in which to place the reflections of the first economists tends to frame this science 
within a socially and historically determined framework. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes 
of the Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith (1732-1790) was published in 1776 and, strictly 
speaking, falls much more within a legal and social than scientific framework. This approach was 
also maintained by subsequent classical authors such as David Ricardo (1772-1823) and further 
emphasized by Karl Marx (1818-1883). However, we can say that due to the effect of Marxist 
criticism, liberal economists were gradually inclined to mute the image and the name of Political 
Economy as a social science in order to highlight the nomothetic aspects of their research, which 
meant a shift in the labels (but not only) from Political Economy to Economics. To John Stuart 
Mill (1806-1873) this tendency seemed clear, for example he privileged a social science approach 
as regards aspects of the distribution of wealth and a natural science approach to the issues of 
production of wealth. From the methodological point of view, Mill distances himself from rigid 
empiricism, both for the specificity of economic problems and because utilitarianism of man is 
knowable by the researcher involved in the subject of human feelings through psychological 
introspection. It is interesting that Mill is credited as the first theorizer of homo economicus, even 
though he used neither this label nor the more common Anglo-Saxon economic man29. However 
                                                 
29 According to Persky (1995), the first use of the term economic man goes back to a J. K. Ingram publication, A 
History of Political Economy, 1888, the Homo economicus label instead spread with Pareto’s use in 1906 in his 
political economy manual. 
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in Mill (1835), economic man is clearly indicated as a useful abstraction assumed by political 
economy through an arbitrary definition that considers this aspect as relevant only for the 
purposes of utilitarian behavior: “A being who inevitably does that by which he may obtain the 
greatest amount of necessaries, conveniences, and luxuries, with the smallest quantity of labour 
and physical self-denial with which they can be obtained in the existing state of knowledge”. It 
was through the Lausanne school that the concept of economic man became the cornerstone of 
the construction of pure economics, which we will shortly resume. 
Another particularly significant aspect of Mill’s position concerns the complexity of 
economic phenomena that he considers "hidden" by a myriad of accidental aspects. It is therefore 
necessary to dig deep in order to discover the true causes of economic phenomena. Mill (1936) 
argued that the complexity of the economic reality should be investigated through a process of 
organization of research into disciplines and sub-disciplines and furthermore, considering a 
specific issue, that it needs to be dealt with first through an analysis that breaks down the 
individual problem into its more simple components, followed by a process of synthesis that 
recomposes the overall framework: “When an effect depends upon a concurrence of causes, those 
causes must be studied one at a time, and their laws separately investigated, if we wish, through 
the causes, to obtain the power of either predicting or controlling the effect since the law of the 
effect, is compounded of the laws of all the causes which determine it”. 
Returning to the methodological approaches already summarized, we can state that Mill’s 
position is characterized by a rather tempered empiricism. He adopted, as it was natural in the 
Anglo-Saxon culture of the time, a nomothetic vision of economics, but his recall to the 
complexity and the intertwinement of the economic contributory causes on a single effect shows 
that he in some way intended to take account of a complex socio-economic reality but naturally 
he shrinks from the idea of totality, evoked in some way by radical rationalism, and emphasized 
above all by critical rationalism. Also because Mill assumes that the disaggregation and 
consolidation of contributory causes of economic phenomena can be made on an additive basis30 
(the whole is equal to the sum of the parts). At the same time, it is clear that Mill preferred an 
approach that privileges adherence of the theory to the economic reality. Abstraction is necessary 
but entails a simplification of the reality that should be recomposed, if wanting to reach a genuine 
explanation of the functioning of the system, not just economic but also social. Indeed, Mill 
                                                 
30 Guala (2002). 
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conceived a social superscience that he called "ethnology" whose task was to summarize in a 
single theoretical framework the scientific theories developed in the different social disciplines: 
economics, political science, morality science, science of religion, etc31. Mill’s approach could be 
seen as the approach of reference, under an epistemological profile, of Anglo-Saxon economic 
thought, both of Jevons "first" marginalism, but also that of Marshall, for whom unlike 
marginalism and especially that of the Lausanne school, the concept of homo economicus was at 
most only a reference and the adherence to reality of the assumptions in economic models was a 
precise stronghold to maintain. 
In the second half of the XIX century, economic research began to differentiate between 
that professed in the Anglo-Saxon world and that professed in continental Europe. In the first 
case, it tended to maintain an "applied" approach based on theories that seek to minimize the 
process of abstraction and simplification of reality to construct theories that maintain the 
maximum degree of adherence to the economic reality as perceived by normal subjects in their 
daily normal economic practice. In continental research, especially due to the effect of Walras’ 
and then Pareto’s work in search of "pure economics", that is to say, divested of all the daily 
accidents to try to find the essence of economics: the pure version of the economic mechanisms 
that only in this form may take the structure of universal scientific laws. In the Lausanne School 
vision’s, the option in favor of pure economics is also legitimated by the possibility to use the 
language of mathematicians in a much wider sense, since the framework of reference is stripped 
of every phenomenon considered secondary. Against this, in Anglo-Saxon economic vision’s 
maintained in the first part of the XX century by Alfred Marshall (1842-1924), the mathematical 
instrument was a tool that could only be usefully for formal verifications, but Marshall himself 
recommended be eliminated from reasoning and from the economic description to remain as 
close as possible to the everyday economic language and experience. At the same time, Marshall 
had a more limited perspective in his analysis (partial equilibrium) because he intended to attain 
the characterization of the complex economic mechanism as the sum of markets, each of which is 
characterized by its own real specificity. 
Instead, the particular curvature of the analysis carried out by Walras aimed at the 
simultaneous co-determination of the equilibrium not only of a single market, but also of an entire 
economic system. This type of formal solution appears not only rigorous from the point of view 
                                                 
31 Ward (1891). 
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of its internal structure, but also elegant, in that it is conceptually simple and at the same time 
general. It appears especially politically correct from the perspective of a capitalist economy that 
theorizes the possibility to attain a configuration of equilibrium and maximum efficiency in every 
market. It seemed the definitive answer to the criticisms of Marxist derivations and knew lasting 
success that was to be questioned only by the analyses of the oligopolistic market structures32, but 
especially by the economic crisis of 1929. 
This approach seems substantially faithful in pursuing the assumptions of radical 
rationalism. The economic system is comparable in its pure form to a complexity of legislation 
having the same cogency as natural laws33. Towards the end of the XIX century, the legitimacy of 
economics as a nomothetic science implies a new term: from Political Economy to Economics, by 
taking on an analytic-deductive definition that expunges historical references in order to find 
"pure", "general" and "universal" laws. It is interesting to note how this construction prescinds 
from any empirical verification, both because reality is something that follows the laws of pure 
economics only in the trend, superimposing a multiplicity of accidental phenomena on them and 
because it is, in essence, an axiomatic construction that is validated by mathematical calculation 
and by a criterion of internal consistency. This new perspectives requires therefore, even if 
undeclared, to eliminate as over-structural and non-determinant everything that would in fact 
make it impossible to proceed with a determination of market equilibria (price and quantity 
exchanged for each market). The calculation of equilibrium thus becomes the tendential point of 
arrival of each market if it were left free to operate reproducing a perfectly competitive situation 
everywhere. 
In part this curvature of economic thought was formed by the search for a completely 
scientific economics statute that guaranteed its authority in a similar manner to the natural 
sciences, but also as a reaction to contrary types of economic settings, developed particularly in 
Germany and Austria, where a historicist orientation prevailed, ideologically adverse to 
empiricism and especially to positivism, but just as unbalanced as them. Suffice to say that, 
according to this historicist approach, political economy, as a moral science, should not have 
                                                 
32 We refer in particular to the work proposed in Monopolistic Competition by Edward H Chamberlin (1933) and in 
Imperfect Competition by Joan Robinson (1933). 
33 There are economists who speak of  physical economics to confirm the homogeneity link between the natural and 
economic sciences and Auguste Walras, father of Leon Walras also an economist, in a letter to his son underlined 
that “We must devote ourselves to economy policy in the same way as one would be dedicated to acoustics or 
mechanics” Leroy (1923). 
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conceded to the mathematical language. A second conditioning aspect stemmed from the attitude 
of the other sciences towards economics. Consider, for example, that even scholars of the highest 
level, such as Benedetto Croce (1866-1952) in Italy, refused to accept the status of "science" for 
economics on the basis of a historicist principle. It was therefore quite inevitable that to these 
historicist positions other were placed in opposition by “pure” economists. For example, Vilfredo 
Pareto (1848-1923), Leon Walras’ successor to the chair of political economy in Lausanne, in 
direct controversy with Croce, defined the new economy as "rational mechanics" where logical 
coherence and formal rigor of analysis prevail through a wide use of the mathematical tool34. 
Leon Walras also, in what was probably his last scientific contribution, traced a close parallel 
between economics and mechanics35. Basically, today we also have the distinction between 
"applied" and "pure" economics, even if these two labels are no longer used, the first includes the 
majority of the approaches adopted in microeconomics and in industrial economics, while the 
second tends to converge in the majority of studies of mathematical economics and econometrics. 
 
3.2. The Chicago School 
There are of course many other formulations and amongst these, the approach of the 
Chicago school must be pointed out. Particularly representative of this approach is Milton 
Friedman (1912-2006) who also studied specific epistemological issues36. Friedman can be 
considered an exponent of a typically empiricist approach, in a certain sense an even more radical 
empiricist than the empiricist economists of the 19th century such as Mill and Marshall. The 
position of Friedman may be summarized by reference to three aspects, a) firstly Friedman was a 
strong supporter of the rational behavior of actors, the concept of homo economicus not only has 
the heuristic function of tracing the behavior of a subject, if put in the position of being able to 
make a decision in a rational sense, but represents an interpretative stronghold of his approach 
and a faithful description of the human behavior. Many of his arguments against economists who 
supported an alternative position were oriented to demonstrating the rational behavior of subjects 
even in the face of behavior that others judge to be economically clearly irrational; b) the second 
aspect concerns the validation of economic theories on the sole basis of their predictive capacity. 
                                                 
34 Faucci (2000). 
35 Walras (1909), “Économique et Mécanique”. 
36 Consider for example his essay: The Methodology of Positive Economics (1953). 
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In this sense, value is denied to the realism of the assumptions in the definition of a theory37. 
Finally c), where it should be indicated, in close connection to the previous point, that the 
devaluation of realism of hypotheses places Friedman among "instrumentalists", i.e. among those 
who deny the possibility that science can and should devote itself to discovering the true structure 
(natural and social) of the world. Theories are only useful instruments to interpret the world and 
to make forecasts on future events38. 
 
3.3. Macroeconomics 
The methodological positions of pure economics were generally abandoned with the 
constitution of the macroeconomic body of studies developed by John Maynard Keynes (1883-
1946). Keynes substantially maintained the methodological attitude of Mill and Marshall as 
regards the concreteness of analysis but applied to economic categories of an aggregate nature, 
considering not so much the choices of a single individual, but the aggregate effect of choices of 
entire categories of subjects. Collective subjects of the classic economist and Marxist elaborations 
were not considered (the classes, the capitalists, the proletarians, etc.) but rather the aggregate 
consumption, the aggregate investment, and the aggregate savings. This elaboration constituted 
an attempt to reconsider economic science following the effects of the great crisis of the 1930's, 
which seriously undermined economic science’s image39. The basic objective therefore changed, 
it was no longer about the determination of the configurations of market equilibria, given the 
economic events that had destroyed the equilibrium myth, but an attempt to investigate the 
conditions necessary for the growth of the economic system and the reduction of unemployment. 
The prestige of macroeconomic studies arising from Keynes’ contributions and from the 
successes connected to the public intervention aimed at economic development and the fight 
against unemployment had not so much the role of affirming a new methodological paradigm, but 
rather to set aside the scientific program of pure economics, reaffirming the traditional Anglo-
Saxon approach. 
 
3.4. Praxeology 
                                                 
37 “The only relevant test of the validity of a hypothesis is comparison of its predictions with experience” Friedman 
(1953). 
38 Guala (2002). 
39 Consider that his most important work The general theory of employment, interest and money, is dated 1936. 
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In a contemporary phase with the emergence of macroeconomics in continental Europe, a 
new Austrian school emerged and especially the contributions offered by Ludgwig von Mises 
(1881-1973). During his economic training phase, this scholar experienced the harsh conflict of 
positions represented by the Methodenstreit that saw the confrontation between scholars of the 
nomothetic method and scholars of the historicist approach. His own approach was in line with 
the first vein although with some autonomous and original developments. On the one hand, he 
claimed the need for an exclusively deductive approach, drawing him close to the previous 
exponents of pure economics, but he vehemently denied that economics was looking to be 
accredited in direct contiguity with the natural sciences: “On the one side he warned that the 
theoretical considerations were of utmost importance for science and for economics and by 
emphasizing deduction, he intended to ensure that it would not be forgotten; on the other hand, 
the attempts by economists to imitate the physical sciences irritated him. He wanted to 
strenuously conserve theoretical autonomy of the social sciences and a deductively oriented 
methodology would have prevented quantitative techniques (the use of which Mises saw as an 
attempt to ape the natural sciences) from earning too much space within economic science"40. 
However, it should be noted that von Mises’ approach had a strong point of contact with the 
approach previously indicated as pure economics and with the radical rationalist approach, since 
he assigned a fundamental role to a priori judgment: "The knowledge obtained from purely 
deductive reasoning is also creative and opens the mind to previously precluded fields”. The 
significant task of a priori reasoning is, on the one hand, to highlight what is implicit in the 
various categories, conceptualizations and premises and, on the other, to demonstrate what they 
do not implicate"41. 
But at the same time von Mises detached himself from radical rationalism, not only for the 
suspicion with which he judged the mathematical elaboration, as much as for the subsequent 
econometric developments, which from the 1940s onwards experienced a phase of particular 
development and prestige for its possible applications in the macroeconomic field. The most 
characteristic aspects of this orientation, for which the label "New Austrian School"42 could also 
be used, was to define economics as an important discipline of the more vast praxeological 
                                                 
40 See Pheby (1988).  
41 von Mises (1966). 
42 Even if von Mises moved to the United States in 1940 where he produced the most significant part of his 
theoretical contributions. 
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science. Praxeology is the science that has as its task to explain human action in its various 
economic and social manifestations. The characteristic aspect of human action is that it is directed 
to a purpose. The purposes in themselves are not subject to investigation, but their attainment 
requires the use of means. Praxeology and its specialized branch: economics, is specifically 
oriented to the rational use of means. It follows that the behaviors of subjects are necessarily 
rational in the use of the means. Economics tells us nothing of the validity of purposes or the 
reasons of the action, but it is able to interpret the way in which human actions are embodied. 
This may seem to behold a return to pure economics but this is not the case because von Mises’ 
economics takes account of: a) aspects neglected by the uncertainty that characterizes the 
reference horizon of subjects and b) the role played by the elapsing of time. This does not 
however imply entering into a historicist optic, since he denied any role to concepts such as "the 
spirit of the era" or "the climate of events" that are part of the baggage of the classic historicist 
approach to economics43. Friedrich HA. Von Hayek (1899-1992) carried on from Von Mises with 
some changes. He stressed particularly the methodological subjectivism of the Austrian approach 
and warned economists against the risk of an abuse of reason44 that he ascribed to Cartesian 
radical rationalism and to the positivistic approach in general. He declared his adhesion to 
Popperian falsificationism45, so we can assume he represents an application in economics of the 
critical rationalism derived form the Kantian view. 
We conclude this concise presentation of praxeology citing the fact that in the literature we 
also know a different version of praxeology that substantially coincided with studies started 
during the Second World War in the United States and listed as Operation Research46. In this 
field, the focus was also concentrated on more efficient use of means, but while in von Mises’ 
praxeology, the study was intended to be of a positive nature, Operations Research’s approach 
was typically normative and substantiated in a set of mathematical, statistical and econometric 
tools applied to the resolution of problems of choice. As can be seen, it was an approach that was 
completely antithetical to that theorized by von Mises and which falls instead into the von 
Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) subject of study. 
                                                 
43 There is considerable divergence among scholars concerning the possibility of entering Albert Friedrich von 
Hayek’s development into the furrow of von Mises. 
44 Von Hayek (1952). 
45 Popper (1963, 1968). 
46 The term praxeology used in a homologous sense for Operations Research was used mainly in France in an effort 
to avoid Anglo-Saxon linguistics. See Caude and Moles (1964) and Kaufmann (1967). 
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3.5. Bounded rationality and satisficing 
The Chicago school’s and Milton Friedman’s approach, with his fervent defense of the 
principle of rationality in behavior, although with a very different curvature from that of von 
Mises, did not fail to raise strong methodological objections from many economists. Among these 
opponents, Herbert A. Simon (1916-2001) played a leading role with his development of the 
Bounded Rationality approach. Simon claimed that there are no conditions for rational behavior 
for subjects in a situation characterized by uncertainty and incomplete information. The subject 
has teleological rationality objectives, some personal reading capacity of the environmental 
characteristics (cognitive limitations) and has developed over time, on the basis of past 
experience, some subjective expectations on the attainability of the objectives. From the moment 
that he is subjected to a series of constraints and stimuli from the environment in  which he is 
immersed, he reacts with an interactive search for a solution (problem solving) that meets his 
expectations. This heuristic behavior foresees a downward or upward revision of expectations in 
the light of the results of the research process. The search ends when the expectations have been 
attained (satisficing attitude) without reaching a situation of optimization of choice because no 
conditions exists to do so. 
Understanding this position gives of a much more social and psychological tinge to the 
economic behavior of subjects and while moving within a framework that stresses experience, the 
nomothetic valence fades away the significance of theories and ambitions to find "universal" laws 
without however entering into the "historicist school" perspective. Simon attacks supporters of  
perfect rationality and choice optimization criticizing the “determinism of situation”: "The classic 
theory of omniscient rationality is individually simple and charming […]. All the predictive 
power comes from having characterized the form of the environment in which the behavior takes 
place. The environment, combined with the assumptions of perfect rationality, completely 
determines the behavior"47. In this way, however, consideration of the different psychologies of 
actors and their cognitive capacity for analysis is neglected. Subjects may have different levels of 
propensity to risk, different systems of information gathering and different levels of expectations. 
It is therefore not possible to reason in terms of laws, but rather in terms of rules that must be 
classified according to concrete situations. We could say that for Simon and the great majority of 
                                                 
47 Simon (1985). 
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economists of the second half of the twentieth century, a sort of "weak thought" prevailed, based 
on hypothetical-deductive concatenations to be validated with the verification of experience48. 
This approach to research did not, however, produce "laws" as previously hoped for, but useful 
heuristic rules. These rules even if partial and imperfect, could be refined over time taking into 
account the development of historical situations. History was important, but a historicist view was 
rejected. Another aspect of particular importance of Simon’s approach concerns the principle of 
rationality which still applied but which moved from optimizing rationality to procedural 
rationality. The players try to approach rationality teleologically, but they do so by applying rules 
of procedure applied to the objective of achieving a satisfactory result.  
 
3.6. American Institutionalism 
At the end of the XIX century, especially in the US, an anti-empiricist version of economics 
matured, which while rejecting a Marxist type approach did not scrimp on criticism of capitalism 
and in particular of American capitalism, whose predatory behavior, encouraged by a process of 
unprecedented monopolistic concentration in many key industries, was denounced. This 
approach, termed institutionalism (Institutional Economy) takes into account the economic 
behavior generated by a variety of phenomena with strong economic characterizations, such as 
the juridical sphere for example. Among the most important exponents of this approach are 
Thorstein Veblen (1857-1929) and John R. Commons (1862-1945). Their approach has divergent 
connotations that we however address with a single label in that both take the historic connotation 
of economic institutions fully into account and use a methodology that is decidedly alien from 
pure economic theories. Veblen’s most noted work is his 1899: The Theory of the Leisure Class: 
an Economic Study of Institutions. Here we have an analysis inspired by evolutionary economics 
that characterizes Veblen’s methodological approach which makes economic behavior derive not 
from forms of individual choice as coeval marginalism does, but from forms of social 
organization and therefore typically connoted in a historical sense. This aspect is especially 
stressed also in Commons’ 1934: Institutional Economics. Commons is best known for 
developing an analysis of collective actions that take shape through institutions. In Commons' 
view, institutional economics added collective control of individual transactions to existing 
                                                 
48 In this elaboration, the point remains that purports keeping analyzed subject and object separate, namely "theories" 
and "facts". 
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economic theory: “Transactions intervene between the labor of the classic economists and the 
pleasures of the hedonic economists, simply because it is society that controls access to the forces 
of nature, and transactions are, not the ‘exchange of commodities’, but the alienation and 
acquisition, between individuals, of the rights of property and liberty created by society, which 
must therefore be negotiated between the parties concerned before labor can produce, or 
consumers can consume, or commodities be physically exchanged”49. The institutional approach 
can be considered an application of the Weberian view to economics. American Institutionalism 
represents an intermediate position between a nomothetic (astoric) concept of economics and the 
hermeneutic approach to economics followed by the Rhetoric approach. 
 
3.7. The rhetoric approach  
We conclude our review of epistemological positions by mentioning also the rhetoric 
approach (Rhetoric Economics) of Deirdre McCloskey (1983, 1988). The author points out that 
(fortunately, in his view) economists systematically go beyond the theoretical areas set by the 
epistemology that they declare to profess, because if indeed they were to keep to the rules dictated 
by empirical evidence they would have very few subjects to study and even less things to say50. 
Essentially, this recalls a sharp turn in economics that abandoned a nomothetic perspective (called 
by McClosky: “modernism”) to move to a historicist approach and to an analysis and exposition 
of theories in narrative terms. Without enlarging on the position of this author, we can say that 
this is clearly a hermeneutic approach that refuses a nomothetic scientific program for economics 
and assumes that economic models are metaphors. The right economic statement is the statement 
able to get the consensus of the people and the mean to do that is represented by rethoric. 
 
4. The phenomenology of the marketing approaches 
4.1. The disciplinary constitution of marketing 
                                                 
49 Commons (1931). 
50 They claim to be arguing on grounds of certain limited matters of statistical inference, on grounds of positive 
economics, operationalism, behaviorism, and other positivistic enthusiasms of the 1930s and 1940s. They believe 
these are the only grounds for science but in their actual scientific work they argue about the aptness of scientific 
methaphors, the relevance of historical precedence, the persuasiveness of introspections, the power of authority, the 
charm of symmetry, the claims of morality. Crude positivism labels such issues “meaningless” or “non-scientific” or 
“just matters of opinion”. McCloskey (1983). 
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It is not easy to identify a historic moment or a date to which to ascribe the birth of 
marketing, essentially due to the heterogeneity of content that this discipline presents. Today we 
are accustomed to thinking of marketing as a scientific discipline divided into several branches, 
the subject of the proliferation cited at the beginning of this work, branches that sometimes seem 
or are perceived as distant from the characteristic themes of economics by virtue of the greater or 
lesser recourse to the contents of other disciplines, typically psychology, statistics and sociology. 
In reality, it can be said that the birth of the array of studies, that converged in marketing, was a 
typical economic problem of resource allocation; in fact the roots of marketing can be traced 
back, on the one hand, to the statistical practices of gathering socio-demographic parameter data, 
which as regards economics are essentially directed at logistical savings51, on the other hand in 
the practices of product communication (advertising), which in a common sense has always 
existed but its systematic study can be more realistically attributed to the second half of the XIX 
century52.The baptism of the discipline, however, is usually designated to the academic year 
1904-1905, when the term "marketing" appeared in a course held at the University of 
Pennsylvania (Weld, 1941). Before that date, however, the University of Michigan and Ohio 
proposed "distribution" and “retail” courses (Maynard, 1941), subjects that would be channeled 
into marketing as it is now commonly understood. No doubt that in this early period marketing 
studies were enrolled within the wide empiricism movement and privileged and inductive point of 
view.  
1915 was the year of the constitution of the National Association of Teachers of 
Advertising (NATA), founded during the annual meeting of the Association of Advertising Clubs 
of the World; thereafter in 1931 in New York, the American Marketing Society (AMS) was 
founded. Five years later, in 1936, NATA changed its name to the National Association of 
Marketing Teachers (NAMT) and together with AMS published the Journal of Marketing for the 
first time. A year later, the two associations merged into the American Marketing Association, 
which is still an important reference point for the discipline today. 
                                                 
51 Lawrence C. Lockley (1950) reports a first electoral survey, published in 1824, where although not actually dealing 
with market research, he adopted the techniques albeit in a simplified way. According to this author, evidence of real 
market polls occurred more frequently from 1879 onwards.  
52 Frank G. Coolsen (1947) suggests the Edwin T. Freedley (1852) Practical Treatise on Business, as a reference on 
this topic; already in 1865, there was however, a monthly magazine on advertising, the Advertising Agency Circular, 
later renamed Advertiser's Gazette.  
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From the earliest "ante-litteram” market research to today, the use of statistics has had a 
leading role in marketing, also evolving from its use as a collection and descriptive analysis tool 
to a tool for the validation of assumptions and formulations of theories, to the point that today the 
adoption of advanced statistical techniques is widely present in marketing articles and, in some 
cases, constitutes a discriminating criterion for the selection of work to be published. However 
today, as has already been  stated at the beginning, marketing has taken on a far more diverse 
nature not only with reference to issues dealt with within each approach but also in the 
heterogeneity referring to the way in which these same issues are dealt with. In this section, we 
will try to highlight the distinctions between the different strands and the epistemological 
arrangement that is the subject of the first part of this article. The strands that seem most 
significant are the following: 
- positive vs. normative marketing 
- micromarketing, macromarketing, exchange marketing; 
- strategic marketing and operative marketing; 
- marketing management and relationship marketing; 
- Fordism and post-Fordist marketing; 
- postmodern marketing, school of critical theory, hermeneutic school  
- experiential marketing; 
- service-driven marketing; 
 
4.2. “Positive” marketing vs. “normative” marketing  
As stated, the first orientation in the constitution of the economic discipline in the 18th 
and in the first part of the 19th century, strongly felt the need to emulate the addresses of the 
natural and nomothetic sciences. Marketing, as a scientific discipline, was structured in a later 
phase and fell into a specialized thematic area of a neoclassic mould within enterprise theory. In 
fact, the most relevant epistemological references are those of the managerial disciplines. The 
Scientific Management in the United States and the European versions of this side of research, 
represented by the Fayol studies in France and by the Rationalisierung movement in Germany, 
had by now gained great visibility and proposed the paradigm of reference in the rational 
behavior field of studies. Marketing studies consequently tended to assume the form of the 
rationalist statute with the decidedly normative slant inherent in these approaches. At the end of 
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the 1950s however, Vance Packard, a journalist working for the publishing house Collier, 
published a book dedicated to the persuasive practices that in his view should be applied in 
advertising in large companies, aided by big advertising agencies53. The volume had 
extraordinary success and strengthened the predatory image that large American businesses had 
acquired from the second half of the XIX century and labeled as robber barons. This publication, 
rightly or not, projected a dark shadow on marketing research and advertising practices and posed 
the question among academics of whether the discipline should or should not have an exclusively 
positive orientation and whether the normative approach should retain scientific statute. The issue 
was resolved in a positive way both in terms of the scientific legality of the normative approach 
and scientific validity of this approach. The aspect that interests us is that the approach 
characterized by a positive type of analysis recalled an epistemology that was substantially 
different from the normative. In the first case, the type of skills required for the 
description/interpretation of the behavior of subjects postulated the use of the psychological 
sciences, whilst in the second case the conceptual basis of reference derived from managerial 
sciences.  
In the USA, at the beginning of the 1950s, psychology was deeply influenced by the 
theories and experimentations of Burrhus Frederic Skinner (1904-1990), professor of Psychology 
at Harvard from 1958 to 1974, who became the supporter of an approach known as Radical 
Behaviorism that postulated human behavior as the result of the interaction of the biological 
nature and environmental stimuli and excluded the use of a deductivist approach54. It is 
unnecessary to stress that this approach was very far from the conceptual apparatus of normative 
marketing analyses that drew scientific reference from deductive schemes centered on 
assumptions of rational behavior of subjects. The conflict between these two positions drew 
marketing towards the field of the radical rationalism of marginalist economics. The first 
consolidation of Marketing as a science was not born in view of empiricism but in view of radical 
rationalism. Historically, this led to a change in the course of marketing studies in a strictly 
normative sense and in the 1960s, a paradigm was affirmed that had its references in the rational-
deductive approach of the economic-managerial disciplines. The most important exponents of this 
address were McCarthy (1960), Levitt (1960) and Kotler (1967). Kotler played a particularly 
                                                 
53 Packard (1957), The Hidden Persuaders. 
54 Skinner (1953), Science and Human Behavior. 
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important role in the diffusion of a typically managerial approach resumed in a four step scheme: 
Analysis, Planning, Implementation and Control (APIC).  In the 1970s, this approach was 
consolidated and became the hegemonic paradigm resulting also from an interesting classification 
of the epistemological and marketing thematic presented by Shelby D. Hunt55. However, to be 
noted is that this approach had a substantially unbalanced structure arising from the fact that 
traditionally a normative approach results in the applicative form of a positive analysis of the 
reality investigated. The fact that a considerable part of positive marketing analyses, relating to 
consumer analyses, postulated scientific skills decidedly outside of managerial studies, impeded a 
direct positive-normative dialectic also reflected in normative marketing studies. Classical 
marketing manuals presupposed the need for the subject agent of a marketing program to analyze 
the behavior of the consumer, but did not provide the methodological instruments to do so. 
Amongst others, the APIC paradigm recommended integration of market studies with competitive 
studies and consumer studies, representing the other branch, but in fact dedicated somewhat 
limited attention to it compared to its importance. 
The effect of this separation and the secondary role of consumer behavior was also 
maintained when psychological and sociological studies oriented to a deductivist sense56 were 
added alongside behavioral type studies, more analogous to the methodological statute of the 
managerial sciences, but far from the typical skills of the marketing scholar. 
 
 
4.3. Micromarketing, macromarketing and exchange marketing 
A first internal contraposition in marketing studies concerns the dichotomy between micro 
and macro marketing. Micro or macro studies date back to the genesis of the discipline, but 
acquired conceptual valence only in the 1970s, due to the fact that in those years the debate took 
shape of whether marketing should only concern profit-oriented activities or if the discipline was 
also relevant for non-profit activities. This issue was inspired by a series of contributions by 
Kotler and Levy (1969), Ferber (1970), Zaltman (1971), Kotler (1972), and was to be resolved 
quite unanimously in favor of an enlargement of marketing studies to also include non-profit 
                                                 
55 A first contribution  to this issue dates back to Hunt (1976) and was then further enlarged upon by him (1983). 
56 One of the pioneers of this approach was Katona (1953), also with an essay on "Rational Behavior and Economic 
Behavior". 
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activities57. This comparison of ideas played an important role in that it began to prepare the 
ground for the subsequent comparison between micro and macro marketing and began to ask the 
question if behind the difference of problems analyzed (profit and nonprofit) there are (or should 
be) also different methodological options. This dilemma was not immediately forewarned of, in 
the sense that it seemed that the previous definition of marketing could also be extended to new 
issues without the need for a revision of the perspective. The fact that marketing had recently 
been recognized as an autonomous science which for reasons of convenience here we call 
"marketing management", clearly plays in favor of a horizontal enlargement of the marketing 
competences 58. However, the reproposition of a distinction such as that between micro and macro 
marketing contributes to a better focus on the issue since micromarketing analyses tend to 
inevitable be made by assuming the viewpoint of a particular agent of the exchange relation 
typically represented by the firm and in particular by its function of marketing and 
commercialization59. This view, in terms of being directly aimed at the operational requirements 
of the large firm experienced a quantitative development not only in terms of studies, but also in 
qualitative terms through the development of a toolbox able to significantly help the marketing 
manager in his commercial policy and communication choices. For example: (a) the introduction 
of the concept of product life cycle developed for the first time by Joel Dean (1950) and 
successively declined in a variety of approaches, some of which however were very 
questionable60; (b) the importance of market segmentation stressed by Wendell R. Smith in 1956; 
(c) the concept of the marketing mix initially proposed by Borden (1964). Despite the evident 
successes of the discipline, the accusation deriving from the criticisms of Vance Packard and 
others, who indicated marketing as an instrument for the exclusive service of firms and not the 
consumer and advertising as a tool of persuasion or even manipulation, must be counteracted with 
a thorough revision from the point of view of the analysis. The answer lies precisely in the 
methodological proposal of macromarketing. While profit issues remain a central pillar of 
micromarketing research and are based on a normative approach, the problems of 
                                                 
57 Among the few opponents to the enlargement was David Luck (1969).  
58 Among those who consider the problem see Feldman (1971). However, his analysis raises epistemological 
questions between marketing orientated to business strategy and marketing that must support, for example, 
maintenance of the environment. The point of view is always that the firm must in substance resolve a problem to 
which environmental constraints are added. 
59 For the issues of the relationship between  micromarketing  and macromarketing see Hunt and Burnett (1982) 
60 Stocchetti and Volpato (2007). 
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macromarketing necessarily entail the analysis of a multiplicity of points of view that consider 
not only actors who operate on the supply side of goods, traditionally having greater bargaining 
power than individual consumers, but also the institutional subjects. Macromarketing is supposed 
to elaborate proposals of markets’ regulations directed at concretizing the much-vaunted 
"sovereignty of the consumer"  operated by the liberal economic thought, but difficult to trace in 
the concrete functioning of the markets, especially after the emergence of  big business in the 
second half of the XIX century61. It is clear that for this type of study an approach is needed that 
is more closely linked to Commons’ and Veblen’s institutionalist type of economic analysis. The 
inclusion of macromarketing alongside micromarketing therefore has an important role in that it 
places at the centre of the debate as much the cognitive objectives of at least part of marketing as 
well as a methodology that cannot be exclusively empiricist or rationalist. Among other things, 
this debate has also had the effect of driving outstanding scholars of marketing management to 
question their research objectives and give more room, in their analysis, to collective interests not 
based on those of the firm. A development of the debate in this sense seems to be the redefinition 
of marketing as a science of exchange (exchange marketing). By placing the exchange at the 
centre of the analysis62, on the one hand trying to establish the discipline on a phenomenon of 
maximum universality, in order to derive nomothetic type generalizations, but on the other to 
postulate a study of distinct interests that are to be mediated in the exchange relation itself. With 
this view, positive analysis gains weight in the functionality of markets and the search for 
solutions with similar cognitive objectives to welfare economics. An echo of this new sensitivity 
can also be found, in our opinion, in the relationship marketing approach discussed later. 
 
4.4. Strategic marketing vs. operative marketing  
The distinction between “strategic” and “operative” marketing is commonly used to 
distinguish two phases having different goals and based on different conceptual tools. Strategic 
marketing concerns the choice of policies aiming at improving the competitive position of the 
firm, taking account of challenges and opportunities proposed by the competitive environment 
                                                 
61 In this respect, suffice to mention the concentration process in the United States following the American Civil War 
in a number of industries, among the first railways and oil, made famous by the works of Daniel Brown (1977) and 
Ida Tarbell (1904). 
62 The first development in this sense is probably credited to Alderson and Martin (1965) and was then taken up by 
Bagozzi (1974, 1975, 2001). 
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and the firm’s internal skills and available resources63. Operative marketing is focused on the 
implementation of specific targets. If accepting this distinction, then the methodological problem 
of strategic marketing refers on the one hand to the knowledge of the states of reality (knowledge 
of the competitive environment), and on the other, to knowledge of the competitive models, i.e. 
the mechanisms governing the creation of durable competitive advantage. The methodological 
problem of operative marketing instead concerns the knowledge of links between the actions that 
the firm can put into effect and the changes in the competitive environment. The two issues seem 
significantly separate on a level of epistemological implications; more precisely, strategic 
marketing requires both reading and interpreting the economic evolution of a complex 
environment directly related to a wide array of social, political, organizational phenomena. In the 
strategic analysis, it is possible to recognize many different schemes of analysis derived from 
alternative epistemological points of view. Studies based on the PIMS data base – Profit Impact 
of Marketing Strategy – amongst which that of Buzzel et al. (1975) is illustrative, are a typical  
expression of empiricism and generally indicated as the first of this strand that was characterized 
by a strongly empiricist and deterministic approach64. There were also positions more oriented to 
adopting critical rationalism, prevalent in the formulation of competitive positioning models65. 
This evolution of the marketing study orientation was probably due to the long phase of growth in 
the international economy that started in the ‘70s. The Ansoff (1965) studies on diversification 
can be ascribed to this particular situation. But more recently the changes and turmoil generated 
by globalization has favoured a different approach that is closer to an institutionalist point of view 
such as that recognizable in the resource-based orientation66. 
Operative marketing, instead, that takes as a given the interpretation of the environment 
operated by the strategic phase and defined objectives, restricts the cognitive issue of validation 
of the hypotheses on the specific relations linking interventions on the environment, or parts of it, 
and their changes in the functional direction to business goals. The wide use of statistical models 
connotes operational marketing as a prevalently empiricist discipline, where strategic analysis 
                                                 
63 Although with different nuances and terminology, the distinction between an analytical/decisional phase (planning 
or strategic planning) and an operational one is common in manuals e.g.: Lambin (1996, 4 sqq.);' Kotler et al (1996, 
68 sqq.). See also Kotler (1999) and Tammo et al. (1996). 
64 Bourgeois (1984). 
65 Hofer’s (1975) contribution seems emblematic in this sense. 
66 Grant (2005). 
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often deductively interprets reality, in the light of a series of principles that unite reason to the 
experience or to the historic reality. 
 
4.5. Marketing management vs. relationship marketing  
The best known and most widespread expression of the marketing discipline, often also 
referred to as "marketing management", proposes to organize and coordinate the principles in two 
dimensions, strategic and operational, with an objective to business goals and with the basic 
assumption that the ability of a business to meet the needs of its target market is the engine of a 
virtuous circle, synthetically termed "market orientation" that generates new resources for the 
renewal of the offer67. 
The foundations of this view were disputed towards the end of the 1980s by an approach 
that enhanced the importance of developing long-term relations among players interested in the 
exchange (Gummesson, 1987), from which the name relationship marketing68 derives. While in 
marketing management the objective is to maximize the value of the individual exchange or a set 
of exchanges, considered in isolation through the action on the object of the exchange (product), 
and on the creation of conditions of exchange that exploit the characteristics of the segment of 
reference (distribution, price, communication). Relationship marketing instead aims to maximize 
on the one hand, the value of all potential exchanges that each relation could activate in the 
future, and on the other, the value of the exchange for both contractors, focusing basically on the 
loyalty of the customer and the creation of personalized exchange conditions69. In the pursuit of 
this approach, the entire organization of an enterprise and the way in which it is coordinated with 
the customer interface that includes the involvement of the customer in the firm’s processes 
assumes importance, whereas in the traditional approach the customer and the organization 
behind the distribution function were clearly separate (Gronroos, 1990).  
                                                 
67 Many are the authors and the contributions that can be ascribed to this approach that is identifiable in the dominant 
American school manuals; among all of them we feel we should refer to Kotler and his work as a whole rather to his 
individual contributions. 
68 Sheth J. N., Parvatiyar A. (1995) show that the concept has roots that date back even to a pre-industrial era, but 
which was then in a certain sense suffocated by the development of mass production. 
69 Gordon (1998) identifies six key points that differentiate relational marketing from traditional marketing, but on 
close examination these points are a more particular characterization of operative marketing than actual conceptual 
diversity. Gummesson (1997) speaks of relationship marketing as a "paradigm shift" deriving from focusing on 
aspects neglected by traditional marketing (mainly the relations, the network, the collaboration).  
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In the course of time, the contrast between these two types of marketing gradually 
diminished, both due to the introduction in traditional marketing, of an ever-greater attention to 
the customer, and for the effective mutual fertilization of the two approaches. Today the 
differences seem limited to that which just above has been defined as "operative marketing", 
because the two approaches do not seem to present methodological differences as far as the 
underlying principles and the analytical part of support are concerned, although there are 
differences in objectives and principles. Marketing management assumes detailed consumer 
preferences as its analysis objective where these do not assume a more precise identity than 
belonging to a certain segment (target market); relationship marketing instead contends that these 
relations should be the analysis objectives and marketing levers70 at the same time, with the 
purpose of achieving a total individualization of policies. The focalization on the "relation" does 
not suggest principles that are antithetical or incompatible with those that guide the relation with 
the customer in marketing management. The literature inherent in CRM seems to be an attempt to 
metabolize the relational principles of operative marketing. In a hypothetical situation in which it 
is economically possible and convenient to devise and serve segments formed by only one client 
the differences between the two views are few (and certainly not epistemological). 
 
4.6. Fordism and post-Fordist marketing  
An important point in marketing studies is the distinction between Fordism and post-Fordist 
marketing. As known, Henry Ford’s strategy was based on a policy of strict standardization of 
product which, accompanied by a large scale offer, allowed minimizing production costs and thus 
aimed for strong market penetration in the first stages of motorization. We know that the 
automotive market’s passage from an first purchase stage to the replacement purchase stage 
considerably reduced the attractiveness of the Ford proposal in favor of producers who were more 
oriented to meeting the increasing degree of segmentation of demand. This occurred in the United 
States in the 1920s, thanks to Alfred P. Sloan’s (1993) strategy that was guided by the motto "a 
car for every purse and purpose" with which the General Motors Group managed to undermine 
Ford’s position as top producer in the world. In Europe, the Fordist phase occurred later than in 
the US and subsequently the transition to post-Fordism also occurred later. However, towards the 
end of the 1980s, the traditional Fordist model was superseded everywhere, also as a result of the 
                                                 
70 Gummesson (1994) proposes a “checklist” of 30 key points to analyze in this regard. 
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effect of Japanese competition71. The development first defined as post-Fordism then became 
defined as post-industrialism. In the post-Fordist phase the emphasis in research and marketing of 
normative proposals focused on consumer preference for variety and innovation in the sense of 
exalting the differentiation of range and specificity of each producer’s brand. The replacement 
demand for cars in all major markets demonstrated that the competitive game rewarded producers 
who were in a position to expand the offer with niche products characterized by strong 
innovation. Marketing research therefore made reference to new concepts72, amongst others, mass 
customization, customer satisfaction, time-to-market reduction, etc. One aspect of this new 
approach was also the accentuation of the role played by customer loyalty. 
It is noteworthy that in this case, the different accentuation of marketing studies did not 
imply any significant epistemological change of perspective. In general, these studies inscribe 
themselves in the normative rationality stream typical of marketing management without feeling 
the need to change their approach following the change of focus of their analyses. 
However, post-Fordism was rapidly followed by the transition to post-industrialism, that 
is to say, to a situation where the economic driving force assumed a new centre of gravity that no 
longer saw manufacturing as a strategic role of the modern economy. On the one hand, it became 
more and more convenient to relocate production activities to countries with low labour costs, on 
the other, a new industrial revolution powered by computer science and telematics was consoli-
dated. The highest added value activities were no longer in the hard component of products but in 
the soft component. Service activities with high added value emerged which became the new 
frontier of the economy. Here we face a more radical change from that described by the transition 
from Fordism to post-Fordism and signs of the utility of a broader methodological reflection 
became more visible. This exigency has been  thrust into the limelight by studies dedicated to 
postmodern marketing.  
 
4.7. Postmodern marketing, School of Critical Theory, School of Hermeneutics. 
If, as we have seen, the emergence of a postindustrial phase began to emphasize the need 
for new changes also in the methodological approach of the discipline, then this trend became 
even more apparent with the subsequent passage from the "modern" to the "postmodern", a 
                                                 
71 Freyssenet ey al. (1998). 
72 Pine (1993). 
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change that some authors began to report from the 1930's, but which became a culturally relevant 
phenomenon in the 1990s. 
Trying to give precise content to the postmodern concept in the limited space of an article 
is virtually impossible, we must therefore refer to the contributions specifically dedicated to this 
issue73 also because we face a multifaceted cultural phenomenon concerning a multiplicity  of 
areas: some of a scientific-philosophical nature, amongst which economics and marketing, in 
addition to philosophy, and others more closely linked to art, literature, architecture, linguistic 
and visual communications. Here we can only recall that postmodernism is characterized in a 
cultural sense by the recognition that the myths of progress74 and humanity’s walk towards a 
more just and balanced future is not only not foregone, as the thought matured in siècle des 
lumières had postulated, but neither is it realistic. Society loses its principal teleological reference 
and individuals were overrun by a feeling we could call "anomy", even if this term was born with 
Durkeim long before the concept of postmodernism was coined. This implied, especially on an 
individual level, a search of the definition of own identity. Consequently, this new mood 
presumed a different function of the theory. 
The responses elaborated by marketing scholars move in three directions: (a) that 
represented by exchange marketing which in a certain sense is further strengthened by those who 
tend to be anchored to the classic empiricist vision of the previously mentioned separation of 
investigating subject and object investigated (b) the critical theory; the detailed and complex 
theory of postmodern marketing in the proper sense that later on we characterize above all in a 
hermeneutic sense.  
From the critical theory perspective it is assumed that theory cannot only describe that 
which is existing, but must be used to change the world, i.e. theory that drives a practice of 
change. A change stimulated also in the methodological bases of analysis of firms and consumers. 
In the orientation that is acknowledged in critical theory, the conceptual reference is to the 
Frankfurt School whose scientific advances wind through a multiplicity of elaborations that in a 
more recent version are summed up in Jürgen Habermas’ contributions. The characteristic of this 
approach is based on the view that a scientific attitude can only be attained through the 
development of thought that not only describes the reality investigated, but also indicates a 
                                                 
73 See  Firat and Venkatesh (1993), Firat et al. (1994), Brown (1995), Cova (1996),  
74 Myths that started to shape the Enlightenment 
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concrete praxis to change the negative aspects of this reality75. The point of departure is therefore 
similar to that of Marxist critique of capitalist society. A society characterized by conflicts of 
opposing interests, but whose nature today is very different from that of capitalists and the 
proletariat of XIX century. The much wider conflict that exponents of this position applied to 
marketing is presented especially in the contrast between consumers on one side and large 
industrial enterprises on the other. Large enterprises that cannot but apply a logic of profit in the 
short term apparently aimed at meeting consumer needs, but in fact aggravating the social 
contradictions of the world: exploitation of strong economies to the detriment of weak economies, 
foolish use of natural resources, worsening ecological problems, etc. Marketing inspired by the 
"critical theory" therefore has the onus of analyzing the contradictions in the social organization 
and developing indications that demonstrate to consumers the ways they can exercise their buying 
power to promote change, for example in favor of ecologically correct consumption that is 
equitable and fair. This critical marketing can and must drive a policy of consumer 
"emancipation"76. From a methodological point of view, the rupture between this orientation and 
classic marketing management could not be more radical. Here the epistemological references are 
those of the historical totality that must be analyzed with the analyst’s assumption of the interests 
of society as a whole in order to highlight the contradictions between the operation of the system 
and the emancipation of the individual. The focus of the analysis is aimed at the identification of 
emerging contradictions between the effective functioning of the social structure (the product of 
prior choices and interests) and the new needs of emancipation of the various categories of 
persons and of the weakest in particular (minorities, children, women, etc.). The cultural matrix is 
Hegelian and Marxian, even if overcoming the contradictions that did not come about through 
dialectic but by means of initiatives of this researcher who became an active actor of change and 
of legitimate, but unprotected, interests. 
From the hermeneutic77 perspective, the recall to postmodernism is much more limited, 
even if this approach does not exhaust the possible valance of postmodernism that may be 
declinated in a plurality of specific orientations. The hermeneutic perspective seems the most 
                                                 
75 The literature on the Frankfurt School is extremely broad, also because it relates to a long period of time. For a 
presentation of its methodological cornerstone, see Connerton’s (1976) summary. 
76 This type of position is expressed in a particularly apparent way in Murray and Ozanne (1991).  
77 Some exponents of critical theory indicate the approach we call hermeneutic as interpretationist. See Murray and 
Ozanne (1991). 
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epistemological and therefore the most relevant. In its more radical conception, social reality 
is seen as a result constructed on the perception of subjects and on the linguistic intermediation of 
actors. The cultural and methodological references were those of more recent French philosophy 
developed on the bases of existentialism and which took a mature conceptual form through the 
subsequent elaborations of many scholars including Jean-François Lyotard (1926-1998)78, 
Jacques Santer, Jean Baudrillard and Edgar Morin, characterizing the current era termed 
postmodern, for the loss of sense that stemmed from the ideological premise that society and 
history were oriented to (and could be interpreted by) a single meaning such as, for example: a) 
the affirmation of the reason of the Enlightenment, b) the movement summing up the spirit of 
idealism, c) the technological and scientific progress in terms of efficiency of capitalism, d) the 
laws of historical materialism of Marxism, etc. Post-modernity is characterized by the fall of 
these ideologies and consequently the dissolution of stable certainties that provide a precise 
meaning to life and identity to subjects according to the ideology they recognize themselves in. In 
this new era, reality is the result of irreducible differences, of a variety of purposes and points of 
view. This also represented several positive aspects that freed new energies and greater creative 
potential, but for many actors was a rather stressful reality. Man is disarmed in front of world 
events that globalization metaphorically brings to the threshold. He no longer has the certainty of 
being able to give a stable meaning to things, nor knows how to interpret, and therefore in some 
way master, all the changes to which he is exposed. 
Moving directly onto the impact of this vision on a marketing level, it follows that the 
postmodern era was also a time of image (accentuated by the identifying role of the product with 
respect to the consumer, the symbolic expression of the status and personality in its many facets), 
of subjective experience that seeks to recognize and identify itself in group life (tribal marketing, 
viral marketing, buzz marketing, etc.), of the prominent role played by the product sharing in the 
formation of affinity consumer circles (various methods of using e-marketing in the creation of 
blogs and second-life type experiences), of the recognition of the importance of making the 
consumer the protagonist in the marketing relation with the company that offers products 
(product launches as events associated with shows, consumer forums in new product 
presentations, etc.), the utility of transforming the point of sale from a supply centre of goods and 
                                                 
78 The most important work of Lyotard, towards the development of the postmodern concept, is La condition post-
moderne: Rapport sur le savoir (1979) 
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services as a time of experiential social community relations, of media events, of elective 
affinities between consumers. Further examples could be given but we think the results of the 
diffusion of postmodern cultural models are by now quite clear. All that remains necessary are 
two further sentences to emphasize that the hermeneutic outlook institutionalizes relativism. 
There is not one reality, but many different realities. Above all, an ad hoc reality for a certain 
category of consumer can be created through initiatives of aggregation, exploiting for example 
the new opportunities offered by new multimedia tools in terms of: one-to-many relationship, 
speed of contacts and richness of the content of contact. The hermeneutic approach is 
distinguished not only by the fact that it manifests itself in a highly subjective dialectic, but also 
by placing focus on the subjectivity of persons participating in the exchange, and even more on 
the subjectivity of consumers themselves. It wouldn’t be useless to underline that this perspective 
is on one side fascinating and goes towards consumer emancipation, but on the other side offers 
the possibility of developing into the triumph of Vance Packard’s  Hidden Persuaders. 
 
4.8. Experiential marketing 
The concept of experiential marketing was originally introduced by Schmitt (1999), who, 
drawing on the well-known contribution of Pine and Gilmore (1998), stressed the importance of 
the "experience" in creating a perception of value in the customer. Basically, for Pine and 
Gilmore it was about enhancing the offer and image of the enterprise through the creation and 
sale of experience based on consumer participation and the aggregation of consumers who take 
part. Pine and Gilmore did not speak of experiential marketing, but of a generic "experience 
economy", whilst Schmitt’s contribution is much more detailed and opposes the experiential 
approach to four limits that he identified in the traditional marketing approach: a) attention to the 
experience of the consumer vs. the prevailing attention to the functional features and benefits79; 
(b) attention to the consumption experience in its entirety vs. the definition of the borders of 
restricted competition to the product categories; (c) the consumer seen as an emotional and 
rational decision maker rather than purely rational; (d) the use of eclectic methods and tools 
instead of exclusively analytical, quantitative and verbal methods and instruments. Subsequently, 
Schmitt detailed an "operational" proposal, but which in fact was entirely free of empirical 
                                                 
79 “Experiences occur as a result of encountering, undergoing or living through things. Experiences provide sensory, 
emotional, cognitive, behavioral, and relational values that replace functional values”; Schmitt (1990, 57). 
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analyses, that identified and classified the types of experience and their sources, with normative 
indications on the possible ways of relating with customers, which in fact constituted the 
operational part of experiential marketing. 
It seems to us that this author’s approach can be considered as closely matching a 
postmodern interpretation of the needs of the consumer to an operational program of critical 
rationalism. A contamination that has become more frequent in this new century where a large 
number of marketing management authors feel the need to take control of new labels of an 
innovative flavor and stimulating perspectives (the marketing of marketing theories also exists!). 
 
4.9. Service-Dominant Marketing 
We conclude our review of marketing approaches80 by indicating the emergence of an 
approach denoted as a service-dominant logic and proposed by Vargo and Lusch (2004). As 
indicated, this approach could be read as a restatement of a new label for known content81 and 
there are also those who recently complained about the need of marketing to take on new 
approaches and new content82. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that this approach has received 
considerable attention and significant conferences have been dedicated to it, organized amongst 
others, by the Marketing Association in 2004 and the European Academy of Marketing in 2005. 
This approach postulates that the service perspective is the core-concept of marketing and that 
products must be regarded as mere instruments aimed at producing services for the buyer. The 
creation of value is apparently not so much in the exchange of goods (value in exchange) as 
assumed by exchange marketing, but rather in the value of the use of goods (value-in-use). This 
approach naturally exalts to the maximum the dialogue and co-creation of value of the interaction 
between the supplier of goods and services and purchasing company83 (Payne et al. 2008) and 
between the company selling and the consumer, with an exaltation of the peer-to-peer relationship 
between supplier and the service recipient, which is inscribed in a now consolidated tendency 
when looking at B2B relations along the supply-chain, but which still seems very problematic 
between supplier and consumer. In epistemological terms, this approach seems to represent a 
                                                 
80 For lack of space, we leave out the analysis of "ethical marketing" and "fair trade marketing" which are typical of 
macromarketing. See respectively Murphy et al (2005); Klein et al. (2006) and Moore et al. (2006); Valor C. (2006). 
81 Ballantyne & Varey (2008). 
82 See for example Sheth & Sisodia (2006). 
83 Payne et al. (2008). 
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generalization of relational marketing but with more robust connections to the demands of 
institutional marketing sensitive to a balanced examination of the interests of the various 
categories of actors and characterized by the role of third parties (institutions) with respect to 
those typical of exchange. The novelty compared to relational marketing is that it is seen as 
specialist marketing dedicated precisely to the relations in the supply-chain and collateral with 
respect to exchange marketing, while service-dominant marketing was born as an extension of 
totalitarian relational marketing and aims to enhance the values and activities able to centre on the 
long-lasting relationship between producer and service user. 
 
5. Conclusions 
Our analysis shows the existence of a wide diversity of methodological perspectives, 
especially within the first two level of the taxonomy (epistemological roots and economic 
approaches). Through an assortment of heterogeneous viewpoints, the range of positions varies 
from empiricist ones, aiming at constituting a nomothetic science (modernist vision) based on 
general and universal laws, up to hermeneutic positions that deny both the possibility to 
determine universal laws, and the significance (objectivity) of data and fact derived from the 
direct experience. Generally speaking, there is no doubt that empiricism suffer from growing 
number of critiques and it is increasing the influence of those who claim for economics a status of 
typical social science, whose rules of interpretation have to be defined within a historically-
featured framework.  
As for marketing scholars positions, an evolving process analogue to that of economic 
science is confirmed; though, we feel to remark that this partial re-positioning of a part of authors 
does not go together with a thoughtful consideration on the significance and the methodological 
meaning and/or implications of this change in perspective. 
Basically, the attitude of those who think in terms of  “weakening” the nomothetic 
approach, rather than trying to define properly an historical approach, is prevailing; this happen 
even between those researchers who seem most responsive towards a re-examination of their own 
analysis in an anti-nomthetic direction. In effect, in several cases a hybrid position emerges where 
the analysis try to consider the historical characterization, but without implying also a reflection 
about the consequences that this change should have on the epistemological ground, that very 
often remain the empiricist one. 
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